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Abstract
We study the Pareto optimal equilibria payoffs of the non-cooperative
game associated with the cost spanning tree problem. We give two char-
acterisations of these payoffs: one based on the tree they induce and
another based on the strategies played by agents. Moreover, an algorithm
for computing all these payoffs is provided.
1 Introduction
Some well-known problems of operations research are studied using models of
game theory: assignment (Shapley and Shubik (1971)); linear production (Owen
(1975)); cost spanning tree (Bird (1976)); flow (Kalai and Zemel (1982)); routing
(Fishburn and Pollack (1983)); sequencing (Curiel, Pederzoli, and Tijs (1989));
inventory (Meca, Timmer, Garc´ıa-Jurado, and Borm (1999)); shortest path
(Fragnelli, Garcia-Jurado, and Mendez-Naya (2000)); and Project Evaluation
and Review Technique (Bergantin˜os and Sanchez (2002)). Borm, Hamers, and
Hendrickx (2001) provide an overview of this literature.
Our paper studies cost spanning tree problems (cst). Consider a group
of agents, located at different geographical points, who want some particular
service which can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source.
Agents will be supplied through connections that entail some cost. They are
not concerned whether the connection to the source is direct or indirect.
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The first issue addressed in cst problems is the construction of minimal cost
spanning trees (mcst), i. e. how to connect all agents to the source such that
the total costs of creating the network are minimized. Kruskal (1956) and Prim
(1957) provided two algorithms for solving this problem. But constructing an
mcst is only part of the problem. Another important issue, raised by Claus and
Kleitman (1973), is how to allocate the cost associated with the mcst among
agents.
Bird (1976) associated a cooperative game with any cst problem and pro-
posed a cost allocation rule called the Bird’s rule. Bird´s paper was followed by
other studies, such as, for example, Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984), who
studied the core and the nucleolus of the game, Kar (2002), the Shapley value,
and Feltkamp, Tijs, and Muto (2000) the Bird’s rule.
These papers examined cst problems from a cooperative point of view. Thus,
it is assumed that agents construct a mcst and share the cost among them in
some specific way. However, if we examine some real problems fitting in the
framework of cst problems we realize that this is not always the case. In many
situations what really happens is the following. Firstly, some agents connect
to the source; subsequently, other agents connect to the source, directly or via
agents already connected, and so on. It is possible, therefore, that the mcst is
not constructed.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003a) studied a real situation where this had
happened. Some villages in a valley had insufficient water, and they presented
their problem to the valley authority. The valley authority constructed a dam,
with pipes connecting each village to the dam, and a water deposit for each
village. These costs were financed by the valley authority. Access to this water
supply was free but the cost of constructing pipes to connect the houses to the
supply had to be paid by the villagers. The villagers had to inform the valley
authority of the network of pipes required for the village and pay the cost. The
valley authority constructed the network of pipes as indicated by the villagers.
The valley authority was the owner of the pipes and was responsible for their
maintenance.
Even though villagers had the opportunity to construct a mcst and share
the cost they did not proceed in this way. Some decided to connect to the source
and others not. Among those who connected, some cooperated and shared the
costs. After the system started to function and was seen to perform well, most
of the remaining unconnected households decided to connect to the network.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003a) modeled this last situation as a non-cooperative
game Γ with several stages. In any stage of the game unconnected agents de-
cide, simultaneously, whether or not they want to connect to some of the agents
who are already connected. The game ends when everybody is connected or all
unconnected agents decide not to connect. They studied the Nash equilibria
(NE), subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) and strong Nash equilibria of
Γ. They argue that, in this situation, the non-cooperative approach is preferable
to the cooperative one.
Later, Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003b) studied the same problem but as-
suming that agents have budget restrictions. This means that agents only can
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pay costs which are at most his budget restriction.
In this paper we study the (Pareto) optimal payoffs in the non-cooperative
game Γ. We restrict our study to cst problems with strict preferences (for any
agent the connection costs to different agents are different). It will be seen later
that cst problems with strict preferences are a very large class of cst problems
(almost all in a mathematical sense).
We characterize the set of optimal payoffs for Γ in terms of the tree they
induce. We will prove that in these trees agents do not want to switch from their
present path to the source. This characterization has two important aspects.
Firstly, of course, the characterization itself. Secondly, it enables us to construct
the algorithm described in the paper.
We also characterize the set of optimal payoffs for Γ in terms of the strategies
played by the agents. We prove that any of these payoffs can be obtained with
strategies in which agents have a threshold cost, and they connect when they
see that the cost they must pay is at most this threshold cost. The main interest
in this characterization is practical. For instance, from it we know under which
circumstances agents will obtain optimal payoffs.
Finally, we present an algorithm for computing all the payoffs associated
with NE, SPNE, optimal NE and optimal SPNE. In non-cooperative games
in general, the computation of all SPNE is a very difficult task. Nevertheless,
in Γ it can be done quite easily.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe cst problems and
in Section 3 the associated non-cooperative game. In Section 4 we characterize
the optimal payoffs in terms of the tree they induce. In Section 5 we give the
characterization in terms of the strategies and the algorithm.
2 The cost spanning tree problem
N denotes the set of natural numbers (we consider 0 /∈ N). Given N ⊂ N,
N0 = N ∪ {0} and |N | denotes the number of elements of the set N. Usually,
N = {1, ..., n} .
A cost spanning tree problem, briefly cst, is a pair (N0, C) where:
• N is the set of agents and 0 is the source.
• C = (cij)i,j∈N0 is a matrix where cij represents the cost of connection
between agent i (the source if i = 0) and agent j (the source if j = 0). We
assume that cij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N0, cii = 0 for all i ∈ N0, and cij = cji
for all i, j ∈ N0.
A cst problem studies a situation where a set of agents wants to be connected
to some source, either directly or via other agents, and every possible connection
has some associated non-negative costs.
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We say that a cst problem (N0, C) has strict preferences if the connection
costs of an agent to two different agents (including the source) are always dif-
ferent. Formally, for all i ∈ N the following condition holds:
Given j, k ∈ N0 \ {i} , j 6= k, then cij 6= cik.
We will assume strict preferences throughout the paper.
Since cii = 0 for all i ∈ N0 and cij = cji for all i, j ∈ N0, C is characterized
by the vector {cij}i,j∈N0,i<j . Given N0, we can identify the set of cst problems
over N0 with the vector space
Rm+ = {x ∈ R
m such that xi ≥ 0 for all i}
where m = n(n+1)2 . Thus, the subset of R
m
+ induced by cst problems with no
strict preferences is a set of measure zero.
We denote by gN0 the set {(i, j) such that i, j ∈ N0} . Given g ⊂ g
N0 a path
from i to j in g is a sequence {(ih, ih+1)}
l−1
h=1 satisfying: (ih, ih+1) ∈ g for all
h = 1, ..., l − 1, i1 = i, and il = j. A cycle is a path from i to i different from
(i, i) . A graph g over N0 is a subset of g
N0 with no cycles.
A tree is a graph satisfying that for all i ∈ N there is a unique path from i to
the source. We can associate to any tree g a cost allocation vector cg = (cgi )i∈N
such that cgi , the cost associated with agent i, coincides with cij and j is the
first agent in the unique path from i to the source1.
We say that x = (xi)i∈N is a Bird’s cost allocation (Bird (1976)) if it is the
cost allocation associated with some mcst.
3 The non-cooperative game
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003a) associate with each cst problem (N0, C) the
non-cooperative extensive form game Γ defined as follows. Initially, nobody
is connected to the source. In Stage 1 agents decide, simultaneously, whether
or not they want to be connected to the source. If nobody or everybody con-
nects, then the game ends. Otherwise, in Stage 2, unconnected agents decide,
simultaneously, if they want to be connected to the source directly or through
a previously connected agent. If nobody or everybody connects, then the game
ends. Otherwise, we move on to Stage 3 and so on. Each connected agent pays
the cost of his connection.
Since we are assuming strict preferences we will describe the results of
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003a) adapted to this case.
A standard assumption - at least implicitly - in the literature about cst
problems is that agents want to be connected, even when they have to pay the
1Our definitions of graph and tree are also called, respectively, acyclic digraph and rooted
tree or oriented tree.
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highest cost given by C. We also make this assumption in this paper. We intro-
duce it by saying that if some agent is not connected then he pays a sufficiently
large cost, α.
We now formally define Γ:
Stage 1. Agents in N1 = N decide, simultaneously, whether or not they
want to be connected to the source. Thus, the strategies of agent i ∈ N1 are
S1i = {a, 0} (0 means to be connected to the source and a remain unconnected).
Let M1 = {i ∈ N | si = 0} and N
2 = N1 \M1. If M1 = ∅ or M1 = N1 the
game ends, otherwise we move on to Stage 2.
Let us assume that we have defined Stage r for all r ≤ t. We now define
Stage t+ 1.
Stage t + 1. Agents in N t+1 decide, simultaneously, whether or not they
want to be connected (to the source or some agent of ∪tr=1M
r). Thus, St+1i =
N0\N
t+1∪{a}. LetM t+1 =
{
i ∈ N t+1 | si 6= a
}
be the set of agents connected
in this stage and N t+2 = N t+1 \M t+1. If M t+1 = ∅ or M t+1 = N t+1 the game
ends, otherwise we move on to Stage t+ 2.
Of course, this game terminates in a finite number of stages (|N | at most).
Let z be a terminal node of Γ, z induces a graph gz =
{
(i, i∗) | i /∈ NT+1
}
where T denotes the last stage of Γ when z is achieved and i∗ is the first agent
(or the source) in the unique path from i to 0. We define the utility function u
as follows:
ui (z) =
{
−cii∗ if i /∈ N
T+1
−α otherwise
where α ≥ cij for all i, j ∈ N .
As in Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003a) we assume that agents only play pure
strategies and agents decisiontaking depends only on who is already connected
to the network and not on the manner in which agents connected to the network.
Then, the subgames of Γ can be identified with the set
X = {R ⊂ N0 such that 0 ∈ R} .
The subgame R ∈ X denotes the following situation. We are in some stage
of Γ where all agents of R \ {0} are already connected, directly or indirectly, to
the source. The number of the stage and the way in which agents of R \ {0}
have decided to connect is irrelevant because the agents are applying stationary
strategies. We take 0 ∈ R for the sake of convenience.
The information sets for the agents are the stages in which they are active
(i.e. unconnected). Thus a strategy si of agent i can be identified with a
mapping from Xi into {a} ∪N0 \ {i} where
Xi = {R ⊂ N0 such that i /∈ R and 0 ∈ R}
and si (R) ∈ {a} ∪R for all R ∈ Xi.
Any combination of strategies s = (si)i∈N induces a unique terminal node
(denoted by zs) and a unique graph (denoted by gs). Naturally, gs = gz
s
and
u (s) = u (zs).
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For a detailed discussion of this non-cooperative game see Bergantin˜os and
Lorenzo (2003a).
Remark 1. It is easy to test the validity of our results when taking α > ci0
for all i ∈ N . Moreover, it is also possible to make ui (z) dependent on agent i.
In this case ui (z) = −αi when i ∈ N
t+1. If we take αi > ci0 our results are still
valid.
Let ΠN be the set of all permutations over the finite set N. Given pi ∈ ΠN ,
let Pre (i, pi) denote the set of elements of N which precede i in the order given
by pi, i. e. Pre (i, pi) = {j ∈ N | pi (j) < pi (i)}.
Given pi ∈ ΠN , we assume that agents connect sequentially in the order
given by pi to the preceding agent with the lowest cost. We say that g is the
tree induced by the permutation pi ∈ ΠN if:
g =
{
(i, ig) such that i ∈ N, ig ∈ Pre (i, pi) ∪ {0}
and ciig ≤ cij for all j ∈ Pre (i, pi) ∪ {0}
}
.
We define the cost allocation induced by permutation pi ∈ ΠN as the vector
cpi = (cpii )i∈N where c
pi
i = ciig for all i ∈ N and g is the tree induced by pi.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003a) characterize the Nash equilibria (NE) and
subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of Γ in terms of the permutations.
For a detailed description of NE and SPNE see, for example, van Damme
(1991).
Lemma 1. a) If pi ∈ ΠN and g is the tree induced by pi, there exists a NE
s = (si)i∈N such that g
s = g and u (s) = −cpi.
b) If s = (si)i∈N is a NE there exists pi ∈ ΠN such that g = g
s and
cpi = −u (s) where g is the tree induced by pi.
This lemma is also true if we write SPNE instead of NE.
Assume that if g is the tree induced by pi. Given i ∈ N the strategy si
induced by pi is as follows. For each R ⊂ Xi, we select an agent i
R ∈ R such
that iR coincides with ig when ig is an agent of R with lowest cost connection
for agent i (i. e. ig ∈ R and ciig ≤ cij for all j ∈ R). Otherwise we take as i
R
one of the agents of R with the lowest cost connection for agent i (i. e. iR ∈ R
and ciiR ≤ cij for all j ∈ R). In the last case i
R 6= ig. Now, si (R) = i
R if
Pre (i, pi) ⊂ R and si (R) = a otherwise.
The next example illustrates this lemma.
Example 1. Consider the cst problem (N0, C) where N = {1, 2, 3} and C
is given by
dtbpF3.0441in2.2866in0ptgrafico3.wmf
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In the following table we compute the NE throughout the permutations
pi g cpi
123 0← 1← 2← 3 (10, 15, 5)
132 0← 1← 3← 2 (10, 5, 20)
213 1→ 0← 2← 3 (10, 30, 5)
231 1→ 0← 2← 3 (10, 30, 5)
312 1→ 0← 3← 2 (10, 5, 25)
321 1→ 0← 3← 2 (10, 5, 25)
This example allows us to make three comments. Firstly, it is possible to
find a strategy profile that is not a NE but its payoff corresponds to a tree
that is induced by some permutation. Let s = (s1, s2, s3) be the strategy profile
given by
s1 ({0}) = 0, s1 ({0, 2}) = 0, s1 ({0, 3}) = 0, s1 ({0, 2, 3}) = a,
s2 ({0}) = 0, s2 ({0, 1}) = 1, s2 ({0, 3}) = 3, s2 ({0, 1, 3}) = 3,
s3 ({0}) = a, s3 ({0, 1}) = a, s3 ({0, 2}) = 2, s3 ({0, 1, 2}) = 2.
The payoff associated to s is (−10,−30,−5) , which corresponds to the
tree induced by permutation 213. But s is not a NE because u2 (s \ s
′
2) =
−15 > u2 (s) = −30 where s
′
2 ({0}) = a, s
′
2 ({0, 1}) = 1, s
′
2 ({0, 3}) = 3, and
s′2 ({0, 1, 3}) = 3.
Secondly, the set of NE and SPNE could be different. It is straightforward
to prove that s′ = (s1, s
′
2, s3) is a NE. Nevertheless, s
′ is not an SPNE. If we
focus in the subgame {0, 2, 3} we realize that s′ does not induce a NE in this
subgame (agent 1 plays a but playing 0 he will improve).
Thirdly, the cost allocation associated with some permutations is (Pareto)
dominated. In this example (10, 30, 5) is dominated by (10, 15, 5)2 and (10, 5, 25)
is dominated by (10, 5, 20) . Moreover (10, 15, 5) is the Bird’s cost allocation,
which is always undominated.
4 Optimal permutations
In Example 1 we saw that the cost allocation associated with some permutations
(and hence NE) can be dominated. The main purpose of this section is to
characterize the Pareto optimal permutations in terms of the tree they induce.
Given x = (xi)i∈N and y = (yi)i∈N we say that x (Pareto) dominates y if
xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and it exists j ∈ N such that xj > yj .
We say that a permutation pi is (Pareto) optimal if there is no tree g such that
−cg, the cost allocation associated with g, dominates −cpi, the cost allocation
associated with pi.
2Notice that agents want to make their cost as low as possible.
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Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003b) prove that if g is a graph which is not
induced by any permutation, we can find pi ∈ ΠN such that −c
pi dominates
−cg. Thus, if we are interested in optimal permutations we can restrict our
study to trees induced by permutations.
Given a tree g and i ∈ N we denote by Pi = {(ih, ih+1)}
l−1
h=1 the unique path
from i to 0 in g. We write j ∈ Pi if j = ih for some h = 1, ..., l. We define the
following set:
Ai = {j ∈ N such that i /∈ Pj and j /∈ Pi} .
Notice that Ai is the set of agents who are not in any path containing i.
Thus, Ai can be rewritten as {j ∈ N such that for all l ∈ N, {i, j} " Pl} .
In our next proposition we present two simple properties of Pi, which will
be used throughout the paper.
Proposition 1. If j ∈ Pi then, Pj ⊂ Pi and Aj ⊂ Ai.
Proof. It is obvious that Pj ⊂ Pi.
We now prove that Aj ⊂ Ai. Take k ∈ Aj . Thus, k /∈ Pj and j /∈ Pk.
Let us assume that k ∈ Pi. Since k /∈ Pj , j ∈ Pk, which is a contradiction.
Let us assume that i ∈ Pk. Since j ∈ Pi and Pi ⊂ Pk, j ∈ Pk, which is a
contradiction.
Thus, k /∈ Pi and i /∈ Pk, which means that k ∈ Ai. 
A tree g satisfies the non-changing path property (NCP ) if for all i ∈ N
and j ∈ Ai, cij > cii∗ . Remember that i
∗ is the first agent (or the source) in
the unique path from i to 0.
This property states that no agent will want to connect to agents in any
path other than the one in which he is.
We now check which of the trees of Example 1 satisfies NCP .
The trees 0← 1← 2← 3 and 0← 1← 3← 2 satisfy NCP because Ai = ∅
for all i ∈ N .
The tree 1 → 0 ← 2 ← 3 does not satisfy NCP because A2 = {1}, 2
∗ = 0,
and c21 = 15 < 30 = c20.
The tree 1 → 0 ← 3 ← 2 does not satisfy NCP because A3 = {1}, 3
∗ = 0,
and c31 = 20 < 25 = c30.
In the trees satisfying NCP agents are lined up (Ai = ∅ for all i ∈ N). It is
possible to find cst problems with a tree satisfying NCP and where agents are
not lined up.
In Example 1 only the trees induced by optimal permutations satisfy NCP .
In Theorem 1 below we prove that this result holds for all cst problems (with
strict preferences).
Theorem 1. A permutation pi is optimal if and only if it induces a tree
satisfying NCP.
Proof. We first prove, by contradiction, that if pi is optimal then, pi induces
a tree satisfying NCP . For the sake of simplicity we take pi (i) = i for all i ∈ N.
Supposing that g, the tree induced by pi, does not satisfy NCP . Since
preferences are strict and i∗ /∈ Ai for all i ∈ N, we can find i, j ∈ N such that
j ∈ Ai, j > i, and cij < cii∗ .
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Let g′ be the graph obtained by replacing in g the arc (i, i∗) by (i, j) . Since
j ∈ Ai we conclude that g
′ is a tree. Moreover, −cg
′
dominates −cg because
−cg
′
k = −ckk∗ = −c
g
k for all k ∈ N \ {i} and −c
g′
i = −cij > −cii∗ = −c
g
i . Then,
pi is not optimal because −cpi = −cg.
We now prove the reciprocal case. Let pi be a permutation satisfying NCP .
Take a permutation pi′ such that cpi
′
≤ cpi. We need to prove that cpi
′
= cpi. Let
us assume, without loss of generality, that pi(i) = i for all i ∈ N . Let g′ be the
tree induced by pi′.
We will first prove that cpi
′
1 = c
pi
1 . By definition, c
pi
1 = c10. Let us assume
that cpi
′
1 = c1j1 < c
pi
1 . Since pi satisfies NCP , j1 /∈ A1 and hence 1 ∈ Pj1 because
j1 > 1.
Let P ′j1 = {(jh, jh+1)}
l−1
h=1 be the only path in g
′ connecting j1 with 0. Thus,
cpi
′
j1
= cj1j2 ≤ c
pi
j1
.
• If cj1j2 = c
pi
j1
we can conclude that j2 = j
∗
1 because preferences are strict.
Since 1 ∈ Pj1 and j2 = j
∗
1 , 1 ∈ Pj2 and hence j2 /∈ A1.
• If cj1j2 < c
pi
j1
we can conclude that j2 /∈ Aj1 because pi satisfies NCP. Since
1 ∈ Pj1 , A1 ⊂ Aj1 . Thus, j2 /∈ A1 and hence 1 ∈ Pj2 , because j2 > 1.
If we repeat this reasoning for agents j3, ..., jl−1 we obtain that cjl−10 =
cpi
′
jl−1
≤ cpijl−1 , jl−1 /∈ A1, and 1 ∈ Pjl−1 . Moreover, c
pi
jl−1
= cjl−1j∗l−1 ≤ cjl−10.
Since 1 ∈ Pjl−1 , j
∗
l−1 6= 0. Thus, cjl−1j∗l−1 < cjl−10 because preferences are strict.
However, this is a contradiction because cpi
′
jl−1
≤ cpijl−1 .
Let us assume that cpi
′
j = c
pi
j for all j < i. We will prove that c
pi′
i = c
pi
i . We
know that cpii = cii∗ . Assuming that c
pi′
i = cij1 < c
pi
i , j1 > i. Since pi satisfies
NCP , j1 /∈ Ai and hence i ∈ Pj1 because j1 > i.
Let P ′j1 = {(jh, jh+1)}
l−1
h=1 be the only path in g
′ connecting j1 with 0. Then,
cpi
′
j1
= cj1j2 ≤ c
pi
j1
.
Using arguments similar to those used above for agent 1 we obtain a contra-
diction. 
Theorem 1 is false unless we assume strict preferences. It is not difficult to
find an example in which a non-optimal permutation has a tree satisfying NCP.
5 Optimal equilibria
In this section we study the optimality issue looking only at the non-cooperative
game Γ. Our main result is an intuitive characterization of the set of undomi-
nated payoffs. We will prove that these undominated payoffs can be obtained
when agents play strategies in which they have a threshold cost and they connect
when the cost they must pay is smaller than this threshold cost.
Given a combination of strategies s we say that u (s) is (Pareto) optimal if
there is no combination of strategies s′ such that u (s′) dominates u (s).
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If u (s) is optimal we will normally say that s is optimal. Bergantin˜os and
Lorenzo (2003b) prove that if s is optimal, there exists a NE s′ such that
u (s′) = u (s). Then, if we are interested in optimality we can restrict our
attention to strategies that induce a NE.
By Lemma 1 we can identify the payoffs for the NE of Γ with the payoffs
associated with the set of permutations. In the previous section we defined
optimal permutations. In this section we define optimal strategies. A natural
question that arises is if there is some relationship between optimal permutations
and optimal NE strategies. Our next proposition confirms that the answer is
yes.
Proposition 2. Let pi be a permutation and let s be a NE such that gs and
the tree induced by pi coincide. Then pi is optimal if and only if s is optimal.
Proof. Let us suppose that s is not optimal. There exists a NE s′ such
that u (s′) dominates u (s) . By Lemma 1 b), we can find a permutation pi′ such
that u (s′) = −cpi′. Thus, −cpi′ dominates −cpi, which is a contradiction since pi
is optimal.
Let us suppose that pi is not optimal. There exists a permutation pi∗ such
that −cpi
∗
dominates −cpi. By Lemma 1 a), we can find a NE s∗ such that
u (s∗) = −cpi
∗
. Thus, u (s∗) dominates u (s), which is a contradiction since s is
optimal. 
Because of Lemma 1 we know that the set of NE is closely related with the
set of permutations. By Proposition 2 optimal strategies and optimal permuta-
tions ”coincide”. A question that arise is if there is some inclusion relationship
between the set of optimal strategies and the set of NE. The answer is negative.
In example 1 we saw that there is some NE which are not optimal strategies
(for instance the NE associated with permutation 213).
We now present a combination of strategies which are optimal but not a
NE. Consider that in Example 1 the cost of connection between the source and
agent 2 is 12 instead of 30 (c02 = 12). Let s = (s1, s2, s3) be the combination of
strategies given by
s1 ({0}) = 0, s1 ({0, 2}) = 0, s1 ({0, 3}) = 0, s1 ({0, 2, 3}) = a,
s2 ({0}) = 0, s2 ({0, 1}) = 0, s2 ({0, 3}) = 3, s2 ({0, 1, 3}) = 3,
s3 ({0}) = a, s3 ({0, 1}) = 0, s3 ({0, 2}) = 2, s3 ({0, 1, 2}) = 2.
It is trivial to see that s is optimal. Nevertheless, s is not a NE be-
cause u2 (s \ s
′
2) = −5 > u2 (s) = −12 where s
′
2 ({0}) = a, s
′
2 ({0, 1}) = a,
s′2 ({0, 3}) = 3, and s
′
2 ({0, 1, 3}) = 3.
Notice that gs, the tree induced by s, satisfies NCP. This means that a
strategy profile ”satisfying” NCP could not be a NE.
We say that si is a threshold strategy for player i if there exists τi ∈ R (τi is
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the threshold of player i) such that
si (R) =


a if min
j∈R
{cij} > τi
k if k ∈ R and cik = min
j∈R
{cij} ≤ τi.
The interpretation is that a player connects when he sees that the cost has
dropped to his threshold value. In this case he establishes the cheapest possible
connection.
Given a NE s, we say that s = (si)i∈N is a threshold NE if for any i ∈ N,
si is a threshold strategy for player i.
We now examine which of the NE of Example 1 are threshold. By Lemma
1 it is sufficient to assess which of the NE induced by the permutations are
threshold.
The NE induced by permutation 123 is threshold. For instance, with τ1 =
12, τ2 = 18, and τ3 = 7. The NE induced by permutation 132 is threshold.
Take τ1 = 12, τ2 = 7, and τ3 = 22.
The NE induced by permutation 213 is not threshold because s1 ({0}) = a,
s1 ({0, 1}) = 0 but c20 = min
j∈{0}
{c2j} = min
j∈{0,1}
{c2j}. Then it is not possible to
find a threshold τ1 for player 1 compatible with s1. Using arguments similar to
those used with permutation 213 we can conclude that the NE associated to
permutations 231, 312, and 321 are not threshold.
In theNE induced by permutations 123 and 132, only one agent is connected
at any stage. It is possible to find cst problems with a threshold NE with stages
where several agents connect simultaneously.
In Example 1 only the threshold NE are optimal. In Theorem 2 below we
prove that this result holds for all cst problems (with strict preferences).
Theorem 2. a) If s is an optimal NE, there exists a threshold NE s′ such
that u (s′) = u (s) .
b) If s is a threshold NE then s is optimal.
Proof. a) Assume that s is an optimal NE. By Lemma 1 and Proposition
2, there exists a permutation pi and a tree g, induced by pi, such that g = gs,
cpi = −u (s), with pi optimal.
By Theorem 1, pi satisfiesNCP.We assume, for simplicity sake, that pi (i) = i
for all i ∈ N.
Let g =
{
(i, i∗) such that i ∈ N and cii∗ = min
k<i
cik
}
be the tree induced by
pi (i∗ will be used with respect to g).
We define the following sets. R0 = {0} . Let us assume we have defined Rq
for all q ≤ t. Thus,
Rt+1 =
{
i ∈ N \
(
∪tq=1R
q
)
such that i∗ ∈ Rt
}
.
It is evident that this procedure is well defined and terminates in a finite
number of steps T (when RT = N \
(
∪T−1q=1 R
q
)
). Moreover,
{
R1, ..., RT
}
is a
partition of N.
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The partition
{
R1, ..., RT
}
satisfies the following condition: If i ∈ Rt then,
cii∗ < cik for all k ∈
(
∪tq=0R
q
)
\ {i, i∗}. We prove this statement. By definition,
cii∗ < cik for all k ∈
(
∪tq=0R
q
)
\ {i∗} , k < i. Take k ∈
(
∪tq=0R
q
)
\ {i∗} , k > i.
Then, k ∈ Ai and hence, cii∗ < cik because pi satisfies NCP.
Let s′ = (s′i)i∈N be such that for any i ∈ N, s
′
i is the threshold strategy
given by τi = cii∗ . If i ∈ R
t, s′i works as follows in the information sets of agent
i achieved when agents play s′ :
s′i
(
R0
)
= s′i
(
R0 ∪R1
)
= ... = s′i
(
∪t−2q=0R
q
)
= a
s′i
(
∪t−1q=0R
q
)
= i∗.
Of course, ui (s
′) = −cii∗ = ui (s). Hence, s
′ is optimal.
We now prove that s′ is a NE. Given i ∈ Rt and a strategy s′′i we will prove
that ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) ≤ ui (s
′).
Let us assume that s′′i
(
R0
)
= j 6= a. Thus, j = 0 and ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) = −ci0 ≤
−cii∗ = ui (s
′).
Let us assume that s′′i
(
R0
)
= a and s′′i
(
R0 ∪R1
)
= j 6= a. Thus, ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) =
−cij . Since cii∗ < cik for all k ∈
(
∪tq=0R
q
)
\{i, i∗} we conclude that ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) ≤
−cii∗ = ui (s
′).
If we continue with this procedure we obtain that ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) ≤ ui (s
′)
whenever, for some t′ < t, we have s′′i
(
∪kq=0R
q
)
= a for all k < t′ and
s′′i
(
∪t
′
q=0R
q
)
= j 6= a.
Let us assume that s′′i
(
∪kq=0R
q
)
= a for all k < t′, t′ > t, and s′′i
(
∪t
′−1
q=0 R
q
)
=
j 6= a. This means that agent i does not connect to agent i∗ in Stage t but con-
nects to agent j at Stage t′ with t′ > t. We are assuming, by implication, that
Rt 6= {i}. Note that if Rt = {i} and agent i does not connect in Stage t the
game ends and ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) = −α < ui (s
′).
If j = i∗ then ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) = ui (s
′) . Let us assume that j 6= i∗. Two situations
arise:
• j ∈ Ai. By NCP we conclude that cii∗ < cij and hence, ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) =
−cij < −cii∗ = ui (s
′) .
• j /∈ Ai. By definition of s
′ if j /∈ Ai and j > i, then agent j connects
after agent i. Thus, j < i. This means that cii∗ < cij , and hence,
ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) = −cij < −cii∗ = ui (s
′).
It is easy to see that for any other strategy s′′i of agent i, ui (s
′ \ s′′i ) = ui (s
′).
b) Let us assume that s is a threshold NE. By Lemma 1 there exists a
permutation pi and a tree g = {(i, i∗)}i∈N , induced by pi, such that g = g
s and
cpi = −u (s). For simplicity sake, we take pi (i) = i for all i ∈ N. We define{
R1, ..., RT
}
as in a). It is evident that if i ∈ Rti , j ∈ Rtj and ti < tj then,
i < j.
We can assume without any loss of generality that si (R) = i
∗ if i∗ ∈ R and
si (R) = a otherwise. If not, we define s
′ in this way and proceed with s′ instead
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of s. Note that s′ is optimal if and only if s is optimal (u (s) = u (s′)) and s′ is
a NE (it is induced by pi).
By Proposition 2 we know that if pi is optimal, s is also optimal. By Theorem
1, if g satisfies NCP , pi is optimal.
We will now prove that g satisfies NCP . Let us assume that i ∈ Rt and
j ∈ Ai. Since i
∗ /∈ Ai, j 6= i
∗. We distinguish two cases:
• j ∈ Rq and q < t. Hence, j < i. Since g is the tree induced by pi we can
conclude that cij > cii∗ .
• j ∈ Rq and q ≥ t. If Rt = {i}, Ai ∩R
q = ∅ for all q ≥ t. Hence, Rt 6= {i}.
Take s′i such that s
′
i (R) = j if j ∈ R and s
′
i (R) = a otherwise. We
know that for all k ∈ N \ {i} , sk (R) = k
∗ when k∗ ∈ R and sk (R) = a
otherwise. Then,
(Mp)
′
= Mp = Rp for all p = 0, 1, ..., t− 1
(Mp)
′ ⊃ Ai ∩R
p for all p = t, ..., q, and
i ∈
(
Mq+1
)′
where Mp and (Mp)
′
denote, respectively, the set of agents who connect
in Stage p when s and s \ s′i are played.
Thus, ui (s \ s
′
i) = −cij . Since s is a NE, −cij ≤ ui (s) = −cii∗ . We can
now conclude that cij > cii∗ because j 6= i
∗.
Then, g satisfies NCP. This concludes the proof. 
Theorem 2 b) is false if s is not a NE. If τi < ci0 for all i ∈ N , then no
player will connect in the first round and the game ends. Hence, in this case, s
is for sure not optimal.
The next corollary is an evident consequence of Theorem 2, Proposition 2,
and Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. a) The set of payoffs associated with optimal NE coincide
with the set of payoffs associated with threshold NE.
b) The set of payoffs associated with optimal NE coincide with the set of
payoffs associated with trees satisfying NCP.
Remark 2. Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003b) prove that the set of payoffs
associated with optimal NE and optimal SPNE coincide. Then, it is easy to
conclude that Proposition 2, Theorem 2, and Corollary 1 are also true if we
have written SPNE instead of NE.
We have proved that the set of payoffs associated with optimal strategies,
optimal NE, and optimal SPNE coincide. Does it hold if we have written set
of strategies instead of set of payoffs? Of course, the set of optimal SPNE is a
subset of the set of optimal NE, and this is a subset of the set of optimal strate-
gies. Using similar arguments to those used when we discuss the relationship
between NE an optimal strategies we can prove that the reciprocal is false.
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We now present an algorithm for computing all the payoffs and trees associ-
ated with NE, SPNE, optimal NE, and optimal SPNE. Given a permutation
pi the algorithm works as follows:
• R0 = {0} and opt0 = Y ES.
• We define Rpi(1), pi (1)∗, Ppi(1) and optpi(1).
Rpi(1) = {0, pi (1)}, pi (1)∗ = 0, Ppi(1) = {0, pi (1)}, and optpi(1) = Y ES.
• Assume that we have defined Rpi(j), pi (j)∗, Ppi(j) and optpi(j) for all j ≤
i− 1. We define Rpi(i), pi (i)∗, Ppi(i) and optpi(i).
– Rpi(i) = Rpi(i−1) ∪ {pi (i)}.
– pi (i)
∗ ∈ Rpi(i−1) satisfies cpi(i)pi(i)∗ < cpi(i)j for all j ∈ R
pi(i−1) \{
pi (i)
∗}
.
– Ppi(i) = Ppi(i)
∗
∪ {pi (i)}.
– optpi(i) =


Y ES if optpi(i−1) = Y ES
and cjpi(i) > cjj∗ for all j ∈ R
pi(i) \ Ppi(i)
NO otherwise
We denote by ΠoptN the set of permutations satisfying that the value of opt
in the last stage is Y ES (optpi(n) = Y ES).
By Lemma 1, the set of payoffs and trees associated with theNE (or SPNE)
are {cpi}pi∈ΠN and {g
pi}pi∈ΠN respectively. Moreover, by Proposition 2 and The-
orem 1 the set of payoffs and trees associated with the optimal NE (or optimal
SPNE) are {cpi}pi∈Πopt
N
and {gpi}pi∈Πopt
N
respectively.
The computation of the NE (or SPNE or optimal SPNE) of an extensive
form game is, in general, very difficult. Nevertheless, in Γ we can compute all
the payoffs and trees associated with the NE using this algorithm.
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